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A B S T R A C T 
 
 
 
Recent experience during Australia’s initial public health response to the swine influenza pandemic provides valuable lessons for 
the future. An intense containment effort lasting 7 weeks was unable to prevent local community transmission in some areas of 
Australia; however, despite the mobility of many people living in rural and remote parts of the country, much of the outback was 
unaffected. By the end of the Containment Phase, most parts of rural New South Wales only recorded low rates of confirmed 
H1N109 infection. As Australians living in rural areas often have poorer access to health services than their urban counterparts, 
they are likely to be more affected by an extended emergency, even one as moderate as the present H1N109 swine influenza 
pandemic. There may have been benefits in extending containment measures in these less affected areas and in communities where 
large numbers of vulnerable people such as Indigenous Australians reside. Containment is worthwhile in limiting the spread of 
disease in specific situations but is unlikely to change the course of a pandemic unless it can be sustained until a large proportion of 
the population is vaccinated. Strenuous containment efforts should certainly be applied in outbreaks of severe disease, particularly 
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those caused by novel infectious agents with a low reproductive rate (R0). Should advances in vaccine manufacture reduce the time 
taken to produce a new vaccine, then increased effort to extend containment will be even more worthwhile. 
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Background 
 
To many who work in biopreparedness, the advent of the 
H1N109 swine influenza pandemic did not come as a 
surprise. Australian health services have been actively 
engaged in developing pandemic plans and conducting field 
exercises for some years1-3. One of the key motivators has 
been the potential risk posed by the highly virulent but 
poorly transmissible H5N1 avian influenza strain, which has 
been circulating globally for more than a decade and has a 
reported fatality rate among confirmed cases exceeding 
60%4. Planning has focused on a worst-case scenario and, 
thus, the comparatively more moderate infection reported in 
H1N109 cases meant some incongruence between the 
perceived level of threat and the public health response.  
 
The inconvenience of social distancing measures and the 
potential economic impact attracted criticism from the 
public, media and some sectors of the health community, and 
there were calls for allowing the pandemic to run its course5-
7
. However, it must be recognised that Australia was among 
the first affected countries in the world and soon posted one 
of the highest infection rates. Unlike North America and 
Europe, Australia was rapidly heading into its peak winter 
influenza season. Criticism of its public health response has 
to be tempered against the fact that little sound 
epidemiologic information was available when Australia’s 
first cases were identified. Indeed, early data from Mexico 
suggested a mortality rate that warranted stringent 
containment measures. 
 
H1N109 Swine influenza  
 
The WHO declared a public health event of international 
importance on 24 April 2009 in recognition of human 
transmission of the novel influenza strain, H1N1098. Public 
health units (PHUs) in Australia were instructed to actively 
seek cases and apply containment measures, including home 
isolation/quarantine of confirmed cases and high risk 
contacts. Antiviral drugs from the national medical stockpile 
were used to treat cases and reduce the period of infectivity, 
and also for prophylaxis of high risk contacts. The 
containment response built on experience gained through 
field pandemic exercises conducted at Commonwealth, state 
and area health service level1-3. 
 
The first confirmed Australian swine influenza case arrived 
in Brisbane on 7 May 2009 on an international flight; by the 
end of the month 306 cases had been identified across the 
nation. Local Australian transmission was identified in early 
June 2009. Global figures reported by WHO showed a 4.4-
fold increase in confirmed cases during June 2009 from 
17 410 to 77 201, while in Australia, there was a 13.4-fold 
increase to 4090 confirmed cases over the same period. The 
disparity between these rates may be related to various 
factors, including surveillance, laboratory capacity and the 
progression of the epidemic but there may be other 
unrecognised explanations. The introduction of a novel 
influenza strain into countries in the southern hemisphere at 
the onset of their usual influenza seasons was considered a 
particular challenge. In Australia the peak influenza period is 
between July and September, when social factors such as 
more activities conducted indoors results in crowding and 
increases the risk of transmission, and low temperatures and 
humidity aid survival of the influenza virion9.  
 
Reports from North America, including Mexico, provided 
valuable epidemiological data10-12. The mortality rate of 
1.1% reported from Mexico at the early stage of the outbreak 
was probably inflated by surveillance artefacts and biased 
towards recognition of cases exhibiting more severe disease. 
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Estimations suggest that the H1N109 virus has a high 
propensity for transmission with a R0 of 1.4–3.5 compared 
with 1.2–1.4 for seasonal influenza13. Fifty to 80% of severe 
cases have had underlying conditions, including pregnancy, 
asthma or other lung pathology, cardiovascular disease, 
diabetes, immunosuppression and neurological disorders14,15. 
Extreme obesity is also being investigated as a potential risk 
factor16. Severe cases and deaths have occurred in young and 
previously healthy adults, and less often in children. 
 
The Protect Phase 
 
By mid-June 2009 there was widespread transmission in 
Victoria and this picture was starting to become evident in 
New South Wales (NSW), largely in western Sydney and 
south-western NSW bordering Victoria17. Infection rates 
varied widely across the country (Table 1) and also within 
states such as NSW (Table 2). On 4 June, Victoria reported 
521 confirmed cases, principally from Melbourne, and this 
increased to 1011 by 8 June. On 17 June, the Australian 
Commonwealth’s Department of Health and Ageing 
introduced the ‘Protect Phase’ across all states, although 
some parts of Queensland remained in the Contain Phase 
beyond this date. The Protect Phase focuses on identifying 
and actively managing vulnerable people with suspected 
swine influenza infection17. At this stage, testing to confirm 
H1N1 infection was restricted to people hospitalised for 
possible influenza. 
 
During the Containment Phase considerable effort was made 
to actively identify cases. Media coverage advised 
symptomatic people with possible swine influenza risk 
exposures to seek medical assistance. Information was 
circulated to GPs and emergency departments regarding the 
clinical and epidemiological recognition of swine influenza 
and doctors were encouraged to contact their local PHU if a 
suspected case presented. More than 2000 people were tested 
in NSW alone. Data recorded in Tables 1 and 2 suggest 
considerable areas of Australia were spared large-scale 
introduction or were successful in containing the early 
spread of the disease, although surveillance is unlikely to 
capture all cases of H1N109. The heterogeneous spread of 
swine influenza also reflects the experience of previous 
pandemics, and provides further motivation for surging 
public health resources to bolster local containment18. In 
addition, it is appropriate to share resources with more 
affected areas in order to sustain containment, particularly 
when local capacity is compromised. 
 
Do containment strategies 
provide long-term benefit?  
 
When the Protect Phase was declared, case rates were less 
than 9/100 000 for most areas of Australia, except Victoria 
and the Australian Capital Territory which were 22-
23/100 000. This raises the question of whether it was 
appropriate for all Australian regions to terminate their 
containment strategies simultaneously when many PHUs 
appeared to be effectively controlling transmission? A 
variety of factors need to be considered in the decision, 
including the value of persevering with containment in the 
face of escalating transmission in neighbouring areas, the 
cost of enforcing quarantine and social distancing, the ability 
to surge laboratory capacity and maintain other essential 
diagnostic services, the virulence and clinical impact of the 
influenza strain, the effectiveness and availability of antiviral 
treatment, and the timeframe for developing a targeted 
vaccine. 
 
In a country as large as Australia with natural barriers of 
distance and geography, it is reasonable to expect that some 
areas can be isolated from the impact of a novel infectious 
disease, even if wide-scale activity is occurring elsewhere. 
Reducing the spread of the novel virus is in part dependent 
on people complying with social distancing measures, and 
there is evidence that Australians will cooperate with public 
health requests19. As only rare cases of antiviral resistance to 
H1N109 have been observed, treatment and prophylaxis 
must be regarded as effective control measures in this 
instance20. 
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Table 1:  Confirmed H1N109 infection rates in Australian states and territories at the end of the Contain Phase, 17 June 
2009 
 
State State population† Confirmed cases Rate per 100 000 
New South Wales 7 041 400 313 4.4 
Victoria 5 364 800 1230 22.9 
Queensland 4 349 500 194 4.5 
Australian Capital Territory 347 800 75 21.6 
South Australia 1 612 000 107 6.6 
Western Australia 2 204 000 117 5.3 
Northern Territory 221 700 35 15.8 
Tasmania 500 300 41 8.2 
Australia total¶  21 644 000 2112 9.8 
†Population figures are based on estimated residential population 31 December 2008 
¶The Australian total includes all territories. 
 
 
Table 2:  Confirmed H1N109 infection rates in the eight New South Wales area health services at the end of the Contain 
Phase, 17 June 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
†Population figures are based on estimated residential population 31 December 2008 
¶The discrepancy with the NSW total in Table 1 is due to differences in population projections. 
 
 
Two weeks after the introduction of the Protect Phase the 
number of confirmed cases in Australia doubled, despite 
confirmatory testing (and hence surveillance) only being 
focused on severe cases. In NSW, 10 cases were hospitalised 
in the Containment Phase and 187 in the following 2 weeks. 
Approximately 20% of those hospitalised have required 
treatment in an intensive care unit21. The first H1N109-
associated death was reported from South Australia on 
19 June and the toll has steadily increased. These statistics 
suggest that H1N109 influenza will result in many cases of 
severe disease when there is widespread community 
infection, an argument for containment if it could have been 
sustained. Similarly, rigorous containment measures are 
appropriate to protect vulnerable individuals and 
communities. This includes people with underlying medical 
conditions and also Indigenous Australians, a group which 
historically has borne a heavy burden during introductions of 
novel influenza infections22. Statistics indicate that 
Indigenous people are approximately five times more likely 
than non-Indigenous Australians to be hospitalised for swine 
influenza21. Currently (1 September 2009), the cumulative 
hospitalisation figures indicate that there have been 
New South Wales area health 
service 
Population† 
 
Confirmed cases Rate per 100 000 
Rural 
Hunter New England 862 967 8 0.9 
Greater Southern 483 282 42 8.7 
Greater Western 301 052 9 3.0 
North Coast 495 329 10 2.0 
Metropolitan 
Northern Sydney/Central Coast 1 134 200 33 2.9 
South Eastern Sydney Illawarra 1 209 111 46 3.8 
Sydney South West  1 394 652 82 5.9 
Sydney West 1 131 294 83 7.3 
New South Wales total¶ 7 011 886 313 4.5 
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4440 swine influenza admissions to Australian hospitals, 
with 13.8% being Indigenous Australians, and at least 20 of 
the 154 people who have died with confirmed H1N109 
infection are known to be Indigenous21. The proportion of 
people identifying as Indigenous in the Australian population 
is 2.5%23. 
 
Rural experiences 
 
During the Containment Phase many towns in rural and 
remote parts of Australia were spared from swine influenza. 
Our experience dealing with GPs from country areas 
suggests that they were enthusiastically engaged in active 
case ascertainment and assisted public health authorities with 
the implementation of control measures. Many were 
reluctant to accept the relaxed measures described in the 
Protect Phase guidelines24. Furthermore, their intimate local 
knowledge often provided the effective surveillance 
necessary for successful containment. A particular concern 
for managing large numbers of pandemic cases once 
established in rural areas is the issue of inequitable access to 
health services and the well recognised shortage of medical 
officers25. In addition, delays in providing confirmation of 
cases from country towns were evident during the 
Containment Phase because of specimen transportation 
difficulties and laboratory turnaround times. The GPs in 
these areas may have to rely more heavily on clinical 
acumen to recognise cases and encourage isolation before 
pathology results are available. 
 
Vaccines 
 
The principal measure for controlling viral infections is 
comprehensive coverage with an effective vaccine. In the 
case of influenza, this has necessitated annual development 
of a vaccine tailored to the forecasted seasonal strains and 
derived from viral antigen cultured in eggs. While the 
influenza vaccine is generally effective, the limitations are 
obvious when rapid production is required for a novel 
influenza strain. It can take months to develop a suitable 
vaccine and further delays are experienced in confirming 
safety and efficacy through clinical trials. In addition, an 
effective immune response may require two doses. For some 
countries the vaccine may be ready as soon as mid-
September 200914; however, it is important that the public 
has confidence in its safety and that full therapeutic goods 
registration is obtained before it is made available. In the 
future, cell-line derived and genetically engineered vaccines 
may significantly reduce the period of time to develop a 
strain-specific vaccine26. During the swine influenza 
response it is possible that some areas could have maintained 
containment until the H1N1 vaccine was available, and this 
could have mitigated the impact of the novel virus, but such 
a strategy needs to be weighed against the increased cost, 
social disruption, and demand on the local health workforce. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although containment measures were universally applied 
across Australia, their impact during the initial response to 
the H1N109 swine influenza pandemic was diverse. It is 
debatable whether the Australian health sector could have 
maintained the intense containment approach for long 
enough to preserve all areas from the affects of community 
wide transmission. However, a compelling argument can be 
lodged for an approach of maintaining containment in 
unaffected areas in future pandemic responses, particularly 
in country areas where access to health care may be 
problematic and there is a high proportion of at-risk 
individuals, including Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders.  
 
In a country the size of Australia, disease patterns are 
influenced by a multitude of factors including population 
density, demographics, cultural traditions and behaviours, 
transport routes, geographical barriers and health service 
capacity. Thus, heterogeneous application of containment 
measures using an ‘area quarantine’ approach should be 
included in pandemic plans for future occasions when 
community transmission affects certain parts of the country 
but spares others. A heterogeneous approach could decrease 
the inherent inequities of an approach of managing only 
individuals at higher risk of complications. Area quarantine 
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would be particularly appropriate for a virulent infectious 
agent where the overall aim is to reduce morbidity and 
mortality. 
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